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Abstract 
This paper interrogates the adequacy of Hegel’s cultural framework 
upon which he constructed a philosophy of history which excludes 
Africa from the scheme of things. In what follows, I argue that the 
Hegelian dialectic is a project aimed at the exclusion of Africa from 
the universal history, leading to certain problematic theses like the 
Hegelian thesis on slavery, which is connected to theproblem of class 
formation and his concept of thestate. This paper is therefore a 
refutation of the Hegelian position, drawing insights from Senghor’s 
discussion of Negritude as a geo-climatic contextualized ideology. 
 
Introduction 
George W.F. Hegel presents an extraordinary interpretation of world 
history in The Philosophy of History.
1
 For Hegel, History is the 
progression of the World Spirit (Absolute Mind, that which was 
before the world, God as He is in Himself) as it manifests itself in 
man while coming to exist in the world. Once in the world, spirit 
yearns for actualization and self-authentication – to make itself what 
it can become. This sort of spiritual thriving of the self involves some 
levels of entanglement of the stream of consciousness with the 
dialectical order.  
Any entanglement with Hegel’s axiomatic accentuations on 
the manifestation of the self must come to terms with his emphasis on 
the different stages of the manifestation of the Absolute spirit’s 
consciousness. Thus, his discovery of the different stages in the 
developing consciousness of Spirit is a by-product of his studying the 
development of state. While theorizing on the conceptual planes of 
the dichotomy between East and West, Hegel identifies four 
historical worlds – Oriental, Greek, Roman and German. In each of 
these worlds, the progressive series of consciousnesses of spirit has 
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its manifestation while the rest of civilization looks on. For Hegel, 
therefore, any historical system should treat Africa as a land where 
consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any objective 
existence. Our task in this paper is to delve into Hegel’s 
philosophical system and examine his treatment of Africa within that 
system.  
 
Hegel’s Negation of Africa from History and Civilization 
Africa is not among Hegel’s four cultures or civilizations. From 
Hegel’s perspective, Africa is said to be unhistorical; undeveloped 
spirit – still involved in the conditions of mere nature; devoid of 
morality, religions and political constitution.
2
 Hence he holds that 
there is a justification for Europe’s enslavement and colonization of 
Africa. For him, slavery causes the “increase of human feeling 
among the Negroes.” Due to his theses on Africa, Hegel is rejected 
by many black scholars. His work on Africa is said to glorify Ancient 
Greece, while it ignominiously and grotesquely denigrates Africans, 
whom he sees as children in the forest, unaffected by the movement 
of history. Joseph Harris holds that Hegel’s “ignominious 
pronouncements”on Africa are “a great contribution to the 
stereotypic imageof Black people.”
3
 However, Charles C. Verharen 
offers the keenest criticism in his essay “The New World and the 
Dream to Which It May Give Rise: An African and American 
Response to Hegel’s Challenge.”
4
 In this work, Verharen marks a 
pleasant display of erudition and a revenge for all Blacks who are 
offended byHegel’s denigration of their race.  
Furthermore, it is important to bring to the fore Hegel’s 
analysis on Africa, which entails three major distinctions; he divides 
Africa into three parts: i. Africa proper – the territory that lies south 
of the Sahara; ii. European Africa – that which lies north of the 
Sahara; and iii. Egypt – the territory that is connected to Asia. Hegel 
refers to “Africa Proper” as “the lad of childhood, which lying 
beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark 
mantel of Night.”
5
  He also holds that “in Negro life the characteristic 
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point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the 
realization of any substantial objective existence.”
6
 Therefore, the 
African has not reached the level of realizing his own being; he has 
not yet realized his person. In Hegel’s words, the African is “natural 
man in his completely wild and untamed state.”
7
 
Hegel’s notion of anthropology offers a better insight into his 
conception of Africa. “Anthropology”, for Hegel, is the study of the 
soul, the lowest conceivable phase of mind, still trapped in nature, 
bonded to the body, and barely above the level of animality. Soul is 
that level at which Spirits sleeps, active only within itself, at one with 
the environment.
8
 He identifies a tripartite phases of the soul, namely, 
the natural soul, the feeling soul, and the actual soul. The natural soul 
is the absolute beginning of Spirit, although unconscious, it is 
completely influenced by its environment. The feeling soul is the all-
inclusive outcome of the accumulation of sensations – sense 
experience, passion, and emotion. Lastly, the actual soul is the 
awakening of the “I.” Here the soul transcends the natural world, 
regarding it as objective and alien to itself. It has become thought and 
subject-for-itself. Thus consciousness is actualized only when the 
soul has moved through these stages.
9
 For this reason, Hegel begins 
his discussion of history with the Oriental World, characterized by 
substantiality, that which is determined by self, an independent being 
of its own. For him, Africa has not reached the level of the actual 
soul. From the Hegelian perspective, the African is still under the 
influence of nature. Hence Africa proper has no role in the world 
history. Until it attains the level where it can transcend the influence 
of the environment, at the minimal level of consciousness, Africa 
proper is unable to fit within Hegel’s philosophical scheme. 
 
Africa: Beyond Hegel’s Anthropological Assumptions 
Upon critical examination of Hegel’s thoughts on Africa, we can 
demonstrate contraHegel that Africa is part of the World Spirit on a 
higher level than Hegel presumes. Does it make any geographical, 
historical, or cultural sense to divide Africa into three parts? 
European ethnocentrism traps itself in contradictions by racially 
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implying “that the real Africa is south of the Sahara,”
10
 while 
geographically asserting that Africa is a continent. Africa is indeed a 
continent. In addition, the term “European Africa” is nonexistent. 
Europe and Africa are two distinct continents. Thus, as stressed by 
Cheikh Anta Diop, Egypt is neither connected to nor influenced by 
Asia. Since prehistoric times, Black Africans have been existent at 
the territory north of the Sahara.
11
 
These Hegelian theses, presenting Africa as the domain of 
thesensual and empiric, are also found in Senghor in a slightly 
modifiedform. The order of abstraction does not fall within 
Negroes’province. Thus, following a maieutic thought, Senghor asks, 
“The Negroes?” “Do you think that we (Negroes) will ever be able to 
beat Europeans in mathematics?”
12
He adds even more clarifications: 
“To be precise, Ihave the impression that indigenous people in 
French West Africa, exceptisexcipiendis, have more gifts for the arts 
and humanities than for the sciences.”
13
According to Senghor, 
science requires abstract thought and rigorous logic. Negroes are 
more attached to concrete things. Indeed, Senghor, for the sake of 
validating Blackness by affirming its specificity, did not hesitate to 
reproduce the prejudices of an era when Egyptology was in its 
infancy and, thus, ignored the fact that Ancient Egypt, located in the 
northeast of the African continent, was peopled by Negroes and that 




Senghor’s Negritude, Geo-Climatic Determinism and the 
Refutation of Hegel 
Conceptually speaking, ideologies such as Négritude offer a general 
theory of the African, which can be explored to refute the Hegelian 
theses on Africa. By affirming a so-called absolute specificity of 
Africa, Hegel deduced a structural lethargy and a lack of civilization 
in Africa. Paradoxically, African intellectuals who opposed Hegel 
saw in his theses all the elements they needed to affirm and justify 
the existence of a specific African civilization that is irremediably 
opposed to the European one, hence Amadi A. Dieng’s (1975) termof 





 The only difference here is that what Hegel 
proposes as an absolute lack is considered absolute asset by 
Negritude.  
With Senghor, Negritude becomes a general theory of the 
African. It is a coherent and systematic ensemble of ideas that first 
reflects a reaction to the colonial past and, second, humanism that 
transcends racial particularisms to reach the Civilization of the 
Universal.
16
 However, Negritude is most often glimpsed through race 
and psychology. Senghor stresses the racial specificities peculiar to 
all people of African descent, the basic theme being the“Black soul,” 
only possessed by people of African descent. Senghor advocates the 
African’s unique culture, strong degree of emotion and sensuality, 
and the Negro’s natural inclination to artand rhythm. To defend his 
position, he introduces the idea of a geo-climatic determinism, which 
allows him to bring in a historical analysis, and shows that 
psychology and race developed in well-determined geo-climatic 
contexts that are not a temporal but historically situated.  
The geo-climatic universe of the African Paleolithic explains 
the sensitivity possessed by Africans. The geography and climate that 
have produced the African type have been transformed over the 
years. Africans spread over various lands and climates. But for 
Senghor, they remain identical in cultural sentiments to the original 
Africans. The eternal Africans, thus, were born in an extremely 
favorable environment. In his The Foundations of“Africanité” or 
“Négritude” and “Arabité,” Senghor notes, in contrast to the science 
of Cheikh Anta Diop in Civilizationor Barbarism that Africans 
appeared 40,000 years ago and evolved in a kind of terrestrial 
paradise. They were living in the kingdom of abundance, in 
permanent contact with beings and things, in a generous nature. They 
learned to love nature in which they were living. Their senses were 
all geared toward beings and things, in an outburst of love and 
sympathy. 
Senghor writes, “It is a joy to live, for all things are close by 
and easy, even all beings: air, water and wind, tree and bird, fish and 
animal. In the youthful vigor of his body, the elation of his senses, 
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Homo-sapiens is open toall objects, to all contacts, to all appeals, and 
even to the slightest whisper.”
17
ThisHomo-sapiens, of course, is 
aNegro. More explicitly, he says, “Thus the Negro-African, Homo-
sapiens, lived first in the terrestrial paradise of the high plateaus, 
where beings and things, especially the trees, were abundant, 
accessible, and friendly. So it is that goodneighbourly and then links 
of friendship were sealed between nature and the Negro-African.”
18
 From this interpretation of Negritude, it is quite obvious that 
nature’s generosity, combined with the tropical climate, has shaped 
Negroes’souls and, more particularly, their sensitivity, for “the 
Negro-African is a man of nature. The abundant environment gave 
him a heightened sensuality.”
19
 Therefore, Africa was this rich 
continent but shut up to external currents. Hegel has already 
expressed this position: “Africa proper is the gold-land compressed 
within itself – the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of 
self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of night. Its 
isolated character originates, not merely in its tropical nature, but 
essentially in its geographical conditions.”
20
For Hegel, Africa’s 
isolation resides not only in the African but mostly in an inaccessible 
geographical environment. Now this serves as the basis for further 
Hegelian denigration and description of Africa thus: 
 
Agriddle of marshland with the most luxuriant 
vegetation, the especial home of ravenous beasts, 
snakes of all kinds—a border whose atmosphere is 
poisonous to Europeans. This border constitutes the 
base of a cincture of high mountains, which are only 
at distant intervals traversed by streams, and where 
they are so, in such a way as to form no means of 




This isolation excludes Africa from the theater of history which in 
Hegel’s mind consists in the European world. Hegel affirms, “For 
[Africa] is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or 





as a result of which Negroes cannot accede 
to the notion of objectivity. Even when they distinguish themselves 
from nature, they are still at an inferior level in the processes of 
humanization because they are overwhelmed with sensations, 
instincts, and passions. Hegel states, 
In Negro life the characteristic point is that 
consciousness has not yet attained to the realization 
of any substantial objective existence—as for 
example, God, or Law—in which the interest of 
man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes 
his own being.This distinction between himself as 
an individual and the universality of his essential 
being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped 
oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so that 
the knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a 
Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting. 
The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural 




Hence, Africans are excluded from the philosophical sphere. They 
have not reached the ability to seize the concept in its objectivity and 
universality, because the concept is expression and reality ofthe 
essence. Negroes’ consciousness cannot reach an abstract level 
because Africa is outside the idea that becomes consciousness. 
Rather, that idea is Europe and more precisely Greece, the cradle 
ofsciences and philosophy and the beginning of reason and history. 
Hegel declares, “Greece presents to us the cheerful aspect of youthful 
freshness, of Spiritual vitality. It is here first that advancing Spirit 
makes itself the content of its volition and its knowledge.”
24
 It is 
pertinent to state that Hegel’s thesis on Africa was not restricted to 
the subject matter of history; it extends to other areas of the African 
experience like moral understanding and the history of slavery in 
Africa. We shall look at these other areas in what follows. 
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Hegel on African Morality and Religion 
Like the concept of Anthropology, Hegel does not express the 
concept of morality in its usual pattern. His perspective is purely 
subjective – excluding all positive duties in connection with the 
family, society and the state, all of which are objective institutions.
25
 
For him, morality, like the soul, passes through three dialectical 
phases, namely: purpose and intention, well-being and ill-condition, 
and goodness and wickedness. Purpose is the acceptance of known 
consequences for the individual’s action and for which the individual 
assumes responsibility. Intention and well-being compose the special 
character of the action, that is, the particular end and its value for the 
individual. However, these first two phases do not constitute 
morality; morality comes into existence when these two phases 
coincide with the universal will. Hence the third face - goodness and 
wickedness. Goodness is rational action, universal reason; 
wickedness is unreasonable action in opposition to universal reason. 
Since the individual is a rational being, he finds within his own 
reason universal reason that is the good and that is the attitude of 
conscience. Therefore, morality is a conscious act of the will.
26
 
Since “Africa proper” has not attained the minimal level of 
consciousness – actual soul – and morality is a conscious act of the 
will, Hegel holds that “we must lay aside all thought of reverence and 
morality . . . if we would rightly comprehend him (the African).”
27
  
He adds, “among the Negroes moral sentiments are quite weak, or 
more strictly speaking, non-existent.”
28
 Can we accept Hegel’s 
statements at face value, considering that his conclusions are based 
on missionaries’ accounts? Hegel believes that morality is born from 
consciousness, and the latter is the awakening of the “I.” Since “I” is 
universal, concurrently, morality is universal. In addition, morality is 
an act of the will that constitutes morality as action. Thus, as it is for 
Hegel, so it is for the African. 
In African culture, the existence of the individual is the 
existence of the corporate. Therefore, “the individual is conscious of 
himself in terms of I am because we are, and because we are 





 It follows that the African is conscious of his 
existence, conscious of the I. “The essence of African morality is that 
it is societary,” – and based on what an individual does – “rather than 
that he does what he does because of what he is.”
30
 Therefore, 
African morality is universal – societary – and the consequence of 
action – what a person does. This concept of African morality and 
consciousness is not just peculiar to an African society, but typical of 
African culture on a continental scale.
31
 Therefore, Hegel’s assertion 
that the African has not reached the necessary level of consciousness 
and thus devoid of morality is unattainable. 
In the same vein like the soul and morality, Hegel discourses 
religion in three phases: i. natural religion, ii. the religion of spiritual 
individuality, and iii. absolute religion—Christianity. Hegel holds 
that “religion is the manifestation of the Absolute in the form of 
picture-thought”
32
—art. Under natural religion, Spirit bonded to 
nature, existing first as a crude form of magic and then passing into 
objective reality – substance, in which religion is pantheistic, and 
finally, culminating in spiritual individuality where God is 
recognized as spirit and personal. The third and final phase—
Christianity—is where God and humanity are reconciled, or in other 
words, the unity of God and humanity is established.  
Based on Hegel’s conception of religion and his reference to 
religion in Africa, it follows that the African exists within the realm 
of natural religion. Hegel accuses Africans being sorcerers, not yet 
conscious of a Higher Power. The African religious practices are said 
to be characterized by fetishism; with the worship of the dead, and 
“death itself is looked upon by the Negroes as no universal natural 
law.”
33
 For Hegel, “it follows that he (the African) has no respect for 
himself; for only with the consciousness of a higher being does he 
reach a point of view which inspires him with real reverence.”
34
 
It is of importance we note that European scholars have 
described African religion in terms as dynamism, totemism, tetishsm, 
and naturalism. These terms display the misunderstanding by 
Europeans of African religion. African culture and civilization in 
general have been subjected to fragrant misinterpretation, blatant 
Ogirisi: a new journal of African Studies vol 11 2015 
28 
 
misrepresentation, and total misunderstanding. As pointed out by 
Mbiti, African religions “have been despised, mocked, and dismissed 
as primitive and underdeveloped,”
35
 disparaged and “condemned as 
superstition, satanic, devilish and hellish”
36
 without the least 
recognition that African “traditional religions have survived, they 
dominate the background of African peoples, and must be reckoned 
with even the middle of modern changes.”
37
 
From the African view point, religion is an ontological 
experience; God – the Highest Power, force or energy – is the origin 
and sustenance of all things. Africans conceive God as the Supreme 
Being, which is elevated to an exceptionally philosophical level as 
rich as that of Hegel. All phenomena, for the African, had their origin 
in a living reality or consciousness that had no beginning and no end, 
existing from eternity to eternity—infinite. What Hegel refers to as 
fetishism and sorcery, the African perceives as a universal power or 
force emanating from God. Hence, as miracles are inseparable from 
Christianity, fetishism and sorcery are facets of African religion. 




Hegel’s reference to the worship of the death is in actuality a 
symbolic gesture made by the African. Rather than worship, it is a 
means by which the departed are remembered, just as communion 
and the veneration of the saints are symbolic gestures. Thus the dead 
are an integral part of African culture. Due to Hegel’s assumption 
that Africans have no respect for a Higher Being, he holds that they 
lack respect for themselves or humanity. “The undervaluing of 
humanity among them (the Africans) reaches an incredible degree of 
intensity.”
39
 Rather, what Hegel fails to understand is the African’s 
attitude toward the person, deeply interwoven in his religion. He 
lacks the comprehensions of how the African translates into 
experience a given evaluation of the person and how this evaluation 
shapes the African’s behaviour or thought. The African begins with 
the premise that the person is a self-defining value, which is a mutual 
experience present in every person. Hence, the person does not and 
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cannot exist of himself, nor by himself; he originates from and exists 
in a social cluster.
40
 As the person defines himself, so does the social 
cluster define itself. Therefore, the African “developed a dimension 
of consanguinity which enabled the person to regard his neighbor as 




Thus far, we can play the African attitude to the person 
within Hegel’s conception of Right, which says, “Be a person and 
respect others as persons.”
42
 For Hegel, “What constitutes a person 
and gives him rights is not mere consciousness, but self-
consciousness.”
43
 Therefore, through the mutual respect for others as 
self-defining persons, the African see himself in others, his own 
reflected being; this is self-consciousness. It does follows that 
Hegel’s assumption that the African lacks consciousness of a higher 
power and no respect for himself or humanity is not tenable. This 
brings us Hegel’s consideration of slavery and class formation in 
Africa in his philosophy of history. 
 
Slavery and Class Formation 
Like many other continents, Africa has experienced its own share of 
human bondage. However, slavery as Hegel explains it has never 
existed in Africa. Hegel states, 
Another characteristic fact in reference to Negroes is 
slavery… Among Negroes,… parents sell their 
children, and conversely childrentheir parents, as 
either has the opportunity… The polygamy of the 
Negroes has frequently for its object the having 
many children,to be sold, every one of them, into 
slavery (the king of Dahomey had 3,333 wives). . . . 
Viewed in the light of such facts, we mayconclude 
slavery to have been the occasion of the increase of 
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The majority of sources agree on the total opposite of Hegel’s 
theses.Slaves in Africa—and this without any value judgment—were, 
more than anywhere else, integrated into social life. They were 
neither pushed aside nor reduced to mere means of production as in a 
slave regime. As Pathé Diagne says, “Slaves are not, as in the Greco-
Roman or Asian world, a pure relation of exploitation. For a long 
time, the institutionalization of slavery has met fierce opposition.”
45
 
According to Diop, Basil Davidson, Paul Bohannan, Philip 
Curtain, Colin Turnbull, and most Africanists, traditional African 
societies downplay isolation and individualism and emphasize 
communities based on strong family relationships. In these societies, 
all members are regarded as part of an extended family, making the 
selling of relatives unacceptable.
46
Human bondage did exist in 
Africa, but it was a local serfdom, very different from the large-scale 
monopolized commerce of human beings. The purpose of theArab 
and European system of slavery was to provide plantations, mines, 
and factories with a forced and free labor.  
According to Diagne, human bondage in Africa was 
primarily social and political not economical. “Political and 
economic rights are granted to all social categories no matter what 
order, cast or corporation they belong to.”
47
Thus slaves have the 
potentiality to move up into the ranks of free people. They were 
granted land (for life in many parts of Africa) to cultivate for their 
own use. They could marry other slaves, and their children would be 
free citizens. Slaves often occupied important positions in 
society.They were used in domestic and also in political and 
militaryactivities. However, as Diagne stresses, it appears that it is 
only with the advent of the Triangular Commerce, better known as 
the Atlantic slave trade—connected to the expansion of capitalism—
that a neat systematization of slavery started to take place in Africa. 
The historian J. D. Fage states, 
There seems in fact to have been a close connection 
between economic development and the growth of 
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slavery within West African society…The 
commercial revolutions initiated in Guinea by the 
Atlantic slave trade, and in the Sudan by the trans-
Saharan trade, seem undoubtedly to have influenced 
the formation in West Africa of a new way…which 





Diagne explains that, in fact, pre-Islamic and pre-colonial Black 
Africa, especially less urbanized rural societies, was essentially based 
on “a horizontal and not vertical democracy, meaning under popular 
forms of power operating through legalistic, conservative and in 
egalitarian regimes and castes. It excludes anarchy and upholds 
order; this will be its strength and perhaps its weakness.”
49
 
For Diagne, this explains the relative nature of the imperial 
power because it could be subject to contestation or even sanctions at 
any time. The level of differentiation and structures of African 
societies can only explain such a sociopolitical order. The analysis of 
such processes leads us to the socioeconomic genesis of African 
States, more precisely, the centralized West African ones, for they are 
of great historical significance. They neatly indicate that traditional 
Africa never escaped from the reality of class antagonism, thus 
undermining the Négritudist position. Class antagonism is often 
understood as a violent conflict between social groups with 
fundamentally divergent economic interests. This could be a 
unilateral perspective. The conflict does not reside in the fact that 
these very classes do not have economic relations. On the contrary, 
they do. But those very relations are contradictory because they 
arebased on exploitation and unequal interests. Therefore, 
socialinequality is indicative of class antagonism.   
However, this inequality, at least at the beginning, does not 
necessarily lead to obvious conflicts. Initially, it remains latent and 
can only be perceived in the will of concerned groups and in their 
efforts to organize themselves in order to avoid anarchy. At that time 
appear orders, castes, and finally classes as so many organic 
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expressions of social inequality.The concerned groups try to 
institutionalize them (that is, to give a legal form and therefore make 
them acceptable for the entire society). However, this organization, 
because it necessarily stems from the initiative of groups in high 
positions and who want to preserve their own social benefits, cannot 
but reflect the interests of such groups. Even if such organization 
shows some form of harmony and collaboration among groups, it still 
expresses class antagonism—not yet visible—in its very principle. 
Pierre Fougeyrollas tells us, 
Under the co-existence of ethnic shepherds and 
peasants, under their hierarchized co-existence of 
orders and castes, Sahelo-Sudanese societies have 
experienced the latent or obvious, repressed or 
exacerbated process of class struggle; the fact has 
been that sacerdotal or warlike noble families have 
controlled peasant and pastoral production… Even 
when traditional African law in general did not 
consider lands and cattle private properties, they 
have remained, in fact, at the disposal of some 





What happens is that those very few whose official functions are to 
divide the economic resources have, every time, seized on the surplus 
production, thus progressively detaching themselves from the 
productive mass. They gradually become a layer of privileged non 
producers and, consequently, make up the state apparatus in Africa. 
As well explained by Dieng, this economic surplus—which is the 
state’s objective foundation—is linked to the exploitation of the vast 
resources offered by the great rivers of Senegal and Niger. Dieng 
shows how, in Africa, 
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the alluvial valleys of Sénégal and Niger have 
favored, in certain areas, the existence of a double 
crop, which creates an economic surplus likely to 
engender social differentiations. . . . Their valleys 
are favorable zones for cattle breeding, agriculture, 
fishing, huntingand the practice of craftsmanship. . . 
. They have been contact zones between populations 
of various ways of life. The commercial cities of 





Thus appears, maybe partially, African reality in its 
authenticity.What is proven is that Africa is not and has never been a 
static continent, impervious to historic movement. Like other 
societies, it has experienced upward historical processes as explained 
by Diop’s Precolonial Black Africa (1987) and Antériorité des 
CivilizationsNègres (1967/1974).
52
 Another important aspect of 
Hegel’s thought to consider is its implications for the state and social 
structures especially the relation of the substructure to the human 
consciousness.  
 
Africa in Hegel’s Discourse of State and Social Structures 
Here, we shall bring to the fore some of the implications of Hegel’s 
treatment of Africa in his idea of history. For Hegel, in its general 
form, the state is not “an embodiment of rational freedom, realizing 
and recognizing itself in an objective form.”
53
Its particular form in 
Africa is not “the idea of the Spirit in the external manifestation of 
human will and its Freedom.”
54
Contrary to Hegel’s views, Karl Marx 
sees that the existence of the state—no matter what level—
necessarily indicates differentiated or protagonist social classes. 
Marx’s perspectiveis to study the state issue in its historic relations 
with the economic mode of production and forms of propriety. He 
says, “The State exists only for the sake of private 
property.”
55
Because the state is the form in which the concerned 
groups asserttheir common interests, “it follows that the State 
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mediates in theformation of all common institutions and that the 
institutions receive a political form.”
56
 
Therefore, the state is only the expression and reflection of 
the socioeconomic reality at the political level, hence, the role of the 
state as the political instrument of economic domination. Its structure 
and function are comprehensible only when related to socioeconomic 
structures, which it aims at consolidating. For Marx, the state is only 
the organic expression of the contradictory process of production and 
reproduction of the means of existence, proper to all class societies. 
The state is explicable only in reference to a society’s internal 
movement. According to Frederich Engels,  
The State is, therefore, by no means a power forced 
on society from without; just as little is it “the 
reality of the ethical idea,” “the imageand reality of 
reason,” as Hegel maintains. Rather it is a product of 
society at a certain stage of development; it is the 
admission that asociety has become entangled in an 
insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into 
reconcilable antagonism which it is powerless to 
dispel. But in order that these antagonist classes 
with conflicting economic interests, might not 
consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, 
a power seemingly standing above society became 
necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, 
of keeping it within the bounds of “order”; and this 
power, arisen outof society, placing itself above it, 





However, as far as Africa is concerned—although the definition 
applies—the determination of the process of state emergence is even 
more complex. Two positions present themselves, both agreeing with 
Engels but conflicting with each other. The first group sees the 
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emergence of the state in Africa as endogenous and proper toAfrica; 
the second explains the state in Africa from exogenous factors, the 
endogenous being secondary. The first position is a reaction to the 
second. 
Starting with the second position, for authors such as Samir 
Amin or Coquery-Vidrovitch, external or international commerce 
gave birth to the state in Africa or more precisely to the centralized 
Sudanese empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. Their position is 
based on the fact that these empires have had solid trade relations 
with mostly Arabs and partly with Europeans through trans-Saharan 
commerce. Theoretically, this stand corresponds to Marx’s stressing 
the civilizing effect of external trade and its importance in the 
generalization of capitalist relationships in Europe. In this sense, 
Maurice Godelier affirms that “in West Africa, the emergence of the 
Ghana, Mali and Songhai empires seems to be linked to the tribal 
aristocrats’control on the exchange of precious products, gold, ivory, 
skins and so on, between Black and White Africa.”
58
 
The refutation of this position is now the goal of the second 
group. The advocates of endogenous causes (Dieng, Diagne, and 
particular African philosophers) see the positing of commerce, 
circulation, exchange, and merchant relationships as being unable to 
found any social structure whatsoever. Unless one espouses a 
clearempiricist position, these elements are only simple effects, 
certainly dynamic and therefore influential at a secondary level, but 
are nonetheless external forms of more fundamental structures. Their 
argument is that production is the basis of all social and economic 
formation as explained in the principles of Marxism.
59
 Production is 
the basic economic nucleus, which in its internal dynamic shapes 
circulation, exchanges, and consumption, which are only derivatives. 
Thus, they formulate two critiques: i. Theoretically, it is 
erroneous to believe that exogenous forms of activity can generate an 
internal social process. From a Marxist point of view, asserting 
external phenomena to be determinant with respect to any social or 
natural reality would be ignoring dialectic and materialism.In such a 
view, each society necessarily has its own auto-dynamic internal 
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structures. Thus, explaining the internal dynamism by external 
phenomena reveals a deliberate ignorance of the notion of internal 
dynamism itself and, in so doing, rooting it to the spot and rejecting 
its real history; and, ii, theories stipulating that the law of supply and 
demand is a fundamental dynamic in Africa are risky, for they lead to 




Their mistake is to explain obvious relations of exploitation, 
established by the capitalist powers with underdeveloped countries, 
as “the deterioration of the terms of exchange.” Such socioeconomic 
theory of international relationships is mercantilist and assumes that 
rich and poor countries are equal partners and that only the terms 
need reworking. As Amin does, to affirm that external commerce 
gave birth to African states, is to deny any proper historical initiative 
to Africa. Such a perspective, considered from the political angle, is 
the justification needed by foreign powers to intervene in Africa, 
supposedly either to free African people or to get them out of 
underdevelopment. For Dieng, the exogenous position is just another 
form of Afro-Hegelianism: 
Many scholars professing the most contradictory 
ideas agree to give international commerce an 
important role in the formation of thegreat Sudanese 
empires. This thesis, at the end, denies all historical 
initiatives of great importance to black people and is 





Hence we stand in close relation to Claude Lévi-Strauss when he 
warns against the temptation for “a piece-meal study of the diversity 
of human cultures, for that diversity depends less on the isolation of 
the various groups than on the relations between them”
62
Both trends 
may be Marxist, but they seem to forget the flexibility and inclusive 
aspect of dialectic. If one is solely looking at Africa, endogenous 
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elements are the source of the state in Africa. But the continent is not 
some kind of self-sufficient island without connection with the rest of 
the world. If Africa is an integral part of the world, then its truth 
resides not only in itself, or in its proper history, but also in the 
historical system that contains it. Therefore, the advocates of 
exogenous factors see one historic process and not several, because 
capitalism—its movement in time and space—is the process that 
universalizes the particularity of its multiple contents and establishes 
a worldwide, unified historic process.  
Conclusion 
From all we have discovered so far, it appears Hegel is not aware of 
the implications of his theses on Africa. Hegel denies rationality to 
Africans, implying inferior racial considerations, with numerous 
damaging effects on the African milieu and social structures. The 
position of this paper is that such denigrating understanding of 
humanity as it relates to Africa must be refuted everywhere. Thus, we 
have been able to show, drawing insights from Senghor’s negritude, a 
sort of geo-climatic determinism that refutes and challenges 
fundamentally Hegel’s racially induced historic treatment of Africa.  
As a philosophical treatise, Hegel’s Philosophy of History 
disrespects Africa’s contribution to civilization. His interpretation of 
Africa’s place in world history is a gross misinterpretation. 
Traditional African culture is very complex, and Hegel’s use of facts 
is not only questionable but shallow. His understanding of African 
culture is tainted, and his assumption – that the cultural 
characteristics of African people could only reach a significant level 
by contact with the outside world (Europe) – is a misconception that 
does not qualify as being historically valid, scientifically adequate, or 
culturally sound. 
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